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MODERN CAPiTALISm: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE POWER, By Andrew Shonfield. Issued under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York and London:
Oxford University Press, 1965, Pp. xvi, 456. $10.50.
"What was it that converted capitalism from the cataclysmic failure
which it appeared to be in the 1930's into the great engine of pros-
perity of the postwar Western world?" This, the first sentence of
Shonfield's book, is indeed one of the great questions of modern his-
tory and social science. It is to the author's great credit that he musters
the courage and the perspective to tackle it, undertaking an inquiry
that boldly crosses national, disciplinary, and temporal boundaries.
Most scholars are too timidly busy with narrow specialized investiga-
tions to attack so basic and significant a question.
If Mr. Shonfield's arguments and inferences are sometimes scien-
tifically unconvincing, if the details of his series of national narratives
come to obscure the central theme, if in the end the reader still cannot
answer the original question or be altogether sure of Mr. Shonfield's
answer, nevertheless the book is a substantial achievement. The author
provides an informative, comparative account of the postwvar economic
experiences and policies of the major Western industrial countries
(not, alas, of Japan). His style is lively and readable. His approach is
pragmatic and undoctrinaire. Both leftists, sure of the iniquity and
waste of private enterprises and capitalist societies, and conservatives,
convinced of the danger and inefficiency of government planning and
initiative, confront in these pages evidence shattering to their pre-
conceptions.
It is possible that the last twenty years of extraordinary economic
progress in the Western World do not signify any real break of his-
torical pattern, any permanent improvement in the performance of
these economies. Perhaps we are enjoying no more than a prolonged
buoyant phase of one of the long swings in economic activity which
some economic historians have detected in the nineteenth and earlier
twentieth centuries. Perhaps, but to Mr. Shonfield, as to this reviewer,
it seems most unlikely. The long wave hypothesis is a doubtful inter-
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pretation of history. Where Schumpeter discerned 60-year waves,
Kuznets finds 20-year cycles. Either way, the swings are not numerous
enough, regular enough, or clear enough to warrant the conclusion
that they are an inseparable feature of Western economic development.
We need not fatalistically accept the prospect that a depressed period
like the 1870's, 1890's, or 1930's lies ahead of us.
One possible explanation for the recent dramatic success of Western
capitalism is the general triumph of Keynesianism. Governments have
learned how to manage aggregate demand by fiscal and monetary meas-
ures, and the political importance of full employment has forced them
to apply the knowledge. The errors of commission and omission that
magnified national recessions and minor monetary difficulties in the
late 1920's into catastrophic world depression are no longer intellec-
tually or politically possible. Success breeds success. If businessmen
believe that governments can and will prevent serious lapses from full
employment, their own investments help to justify their own confident
expectations.
This explanation is hard to refute. A commitment to full employ-
ment and to Keynesian policy-though in various degrees and disguises
-is about the only common thread running through the various na-
tional success stories Mr. Shonfield recounts. The power of the explana-
tion has been further enhanced, since Mr. Shonfield laid down his pen,
by the vigorous growth of the U.S. economy in 1965 and 1966 under
the stimulus of Keynesian measures.
Mr. Shonfield does not accept the Keynesian explanation. He believes
that a new and larger governmental influence in the economy is the
key postwar development. He does not mean merely the more vigorous
and intelligent use of general fiscal and monetary controls over aggre-
gate demand. He has in mind more detailed and specific government
interventions. He refers to the management of supply as well as the
stabilization of demand, to government plans and policies that shape
the composition of output and investment and the distribution of
income as well as those that merely seek to maintain full employment.
Certainly Mr. Shonfield recounts a number of interesting experi-
ments in public economic policy, many of which involve the blending
of public and private interests, plans, and decisions. These include:
the French Plan and its recent British adaptation; Swedish manpower
planning and policy; Swedish and Dutch wage-setting procedures; so-
cial services in Germany, Britain, and elsewhere; the promotion, espe-
cially in Germany, of favored lines of investment by subsidies, tax
concessions, and public credit; the state and mixed-state-and-private
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enterprises of Italy. If the catalog does nothing else, it shows that econ-
omies can prosper and grow with widely differing degrees and kinds
of public intervention. This very fact sheds doubt on Mr. Shonfield's
proposition, or rather intimation, that long-range plans for the growth
and composition of productive capacity, designed and executed jointly
by governmental authorities and private economic interests, are the
secret of capitalism's latter-day success.
France and Britain are the chief exhibits offered to prove the case.
Obviously the author feels most at home in discussing these two con-
trasting cases, and they receive much more attention than other coun-
tries. He shows how the long tradition of centralization, Etatism, and
elite bureaucracy in France paved the way for the recent successes of
French planning. Certainly the French experience shows how plans
developed in give-and-take between bureaucrats and businessmen can
provide coherent guides to the policies of both, while leaving consid-
erable freedom for individual initiative and decision. The annoying
historical question remains: Why did the Napoleonic state apparatus
that has achieved such miraculous economic results since the Second
World War produce so dismal an economic record before?
Britain is the case par excellence where the management of demand
to maintain full employment has not been enough-some would say
it has been too much. The growth of productivity has been disappoint-
ingly slow. Why? One culprit is "stop-go" policy. In each recurring
sterling crisis the British authorities have shortsightedly taken meas-
ures to curtail investment, rather than consumption. But it also ap-
pears that investment has yielded less pay-off in improved productivity
in Britain than elsewhere, notably France. One reason may be lack
of intelligent planning, particularly by the nationalized industries.
But another may be the vested interests in inefficient and obsolete
methods built up by and for security-minded unions and managements.
Perhaps exposure to competition rather than corporatist planning is
the indicated therapy.
Before concluding that France shows the success of planning and
Britain the failure of Keynesianism without planning, a reader of
Mr. Shonfield's book should remember another crucial contrast be-
tween the two countries in the last decade. For most of this period,
France has had an under-valued and Britain an over-valued currency.
Having devalued the franc in 1958, France has since then enjoyed the
stimulus of booming exports and the freedom to manage its economy
without worrying about the foreign exchanges, not to mention the
reformed sinner's pleasure in preaching financial rectitude to the rest
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of the world from the safety of a mountain of gold. Britain, in contrast,
has been stubbornly clinging to an exchange parity that dooms the
country to chronic payments deficits and repeated crises of confidence.
Mr. Shonfield emphasizes the liberalization and expansion of inter-
national trade as a factor favorable to postwar Western prosperity, and
he rightly points to the international monetary system as a potential
Achilles' heel. He does not, however, sufficiently consider how the struc-
ture of exchange rates caused liberalization of trade and other inter-
national transactions to have quite a different impact on the various
countries he studied.
Mr. Shonfield, to his credit, devotes the concluding chapter of his
book to a thoughtful essay on the problem of assuring democratic
control of the economic planning he admires. This is more than the
usual problem of controlling a bureaucracy to which power of decision
on important complex matters has been delegated. How can elected
officials control intimate collaboration between bureaucratic experts
and organized private interests? How do spokesmen and negotiators
for functional groups-Labor or Business or Chemical Industry or
Agriculture-acquire legitimacy? The corporate state is not an appe-
tizing prospect. Fortunately a democratic government can probably
plan and guide the growth of a mixed economy without enlarging its
powers or sharing them with private groups.
JAMES TOB1t
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. By Louis L. Jaffe."
Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965. Pp. xvi, 792.
After many years of judicial review of government agencies, the law
on this subject is still obscure and uncertain. Professor Louis L. Jaffe's
important new treatise, Judicial Control of Administrative Action,
describes the judicially developed techniques to control or, perhaps
more accurately, to influence administrative action. He discusses such
basic matters as standing, sovereign immunity, exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies, and the scope and manner of judicial enforcement of
agency orders. But beyond the usual topics, Professor Jaffe also deals
with less frequently considered problems, such as the judicial power to
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